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Existing evidence using US data show a simultaneous covariability between a stock’s price
and quarterly ﬂows into and out of the stock by institutional investors. In this paper we use
data on monthly changes in holdings by all investor groups at the Oslo Stock Exchange to
show that such quarterly eﬀects are concentrated within a month. We ﬁnd a positive relation
between monthly net ﬂows into a stock by institutions and foreigners and the stock’s return. We
ﬁnd no evidence of any eﬀects the next month, providing evidence against the hypothesis that
quarterly results are due to within-quarter feedback. Such feedback eﬀects must be of less than
one month duration. We show that oﬀsetting net inﬂows by mutual funds and foreigners are
net outﬂows by individual and nonﬁnancial investors. The interesting question is which of these
groups are active in “pushing prices.” While we can not empirically distinguish which of the
various investor groups is reacting, we argue that the most reasonable story is that institutions
and foreign investors are the active parties, since the prices move in the direction of these groups’
trades. The lack of next-month feedback (price reversals) is consistent with prices moving toward
fundamentals.
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Introduction
Empirical evidence has accumulated of co-movements between a stock’s price and ﬂows in or out
of the stock by certain investor types. The best known example is the evidence that a stock’s
price go up during a period when institutional investors as a group increase their holdings in the
stock. There are two main hypotheses being investigated. One is that the observed behaviour
is driven by informed traders moving prices toward their fundamental values. The alternative
hypothesis is that the observed behaviour is a result of herding, correlated trading by certain
investor groups pushing prices temporary away from fundamental values.
In our study of the Oslo Stock Exchange we ﬁnd clear evidence of simultaneous movement
of asset prices and movements in and out of the stock by certain types of investors. We show
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1that there is a diﬀerence between the trades of ﬁnancials and foreigners on the one hand and
individual investors and nonﬁnancials on the other hand, with the trades of the former group
co-varying positively with returns, and the trades of the latter group co-varying negatively.
Our study intersects several strands of empirical literature. First, there is a large literature
on trading of mutual funds, starting with Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), followed
by e.g. Wermers (1999), Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006). This
literature shows that a stock’s price moves simultaneously with movement in and out of the
stock by institutional investors. The price follows the direction of trade by institutions: When
institutions are buying, the stock price is going up in the same period. Most of this literature
relies on quarterly observations of institutional holdings, since this is the interval at which in-
stitutions have to report. Secondly, we relate to a literature on the eﬀects of foreign investors
on a stock market, in particular analyzing the impact of foreign investors on information pro-
duction, such as Kang and Stulz (1997), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and Covrig, Lau, and
Ng (2006). The third strand of literature we contribute to analyzes the trading behaviour of
individual investors, much of it behaviorally based, arguing that (some) individuals tend to trade
less rationally than other investor types (Barber and Odean (2000) is a prominent example).
Our paper contributes to all of these literatures, primarily due to our data on the complete
holdings of all owners at the Oslo Stock Exchange over a 18 year period, most of the time with
monthly observations. The fact that we have monthly observations rather than the quarterly
observations used in most US studies of mutual funds allow us to look more closely at the timing
of trading, and conclude that the quarterly eﬀects found in US papers are concentrated within
a month. Relative to studies of individual investors behaviour we have much more complete
data, since we have access to the holdings of all individual investors, not merely a sample of
individuals, for example the customers of one broker, used in the typical US studies.
There are thus three important ways in which we contribute to the literature. First, we show
to what extent the typical US results are true in a diﬀerent market, the Oslo Stock Exchange.
Second, we look at all investors on the exchange simultaneously, we are not just looking at
e.g. the group of institutional investors. Thirdly, we have this complete data at a monthly,
rather than quarterly frequency. We also have the data for a relatively long time period, from
1992 to 2007.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the theoretical setting and gives some
references to relevant empirical studies. Section 2 gives a short overview of the data sources.
In section 3 we provide descriptive statistics for the ownership on the OSE and analyze the
determinants of ownership by various investor types. Among the more interesting results are ev-
idence on the composition of the portfolios of foreign and institutional investors, which we show
to concentrate in larger ﬁrms with higher liquidity and lower ownership concentration. This
behaviour is consistent with evidence from other markets. We show that the oﬀsetting groups
of investors are individual investors and nonﬁnancial (corporate) investors, which are overrep-
resented in smaller ﬁrms with low liquidity and concentrated ownership. Section 4 contains
the most important results of the paper, documenting contemporaneous comovement between
2monthly stock returns and movements in or out of the stock by diﬀerent investor groups. We
show that stock prices increase the same month that institutional and foreign investors increase
their holdings in a stock and individuals and nonﬁnancials decrease their holdings. We also
show that there is no lagged eﬀect, next month returns are not aﬀected by the previous month’s
change in ownership composition. In section 5 we control for diﬀerences in risk characteristics
of the portfolios of the various owner types, by redoing the analysis using returns in excess of
an asset pricing model, showing that the results are not sensitive to risk adjustments. Section 6
oﬀers a short conclusion.
1 Theoretical and empirical background
This paper concerns the behaviour of diﬀerent types of investors, whether investors of a particular
group behave in a correlated manner, and whether such correlated behaviour by speciﬁc groups
aﬀect asset prices. Most of the relevant theoretical literature concern trading by institutional
investors. Let us therefore start by using this perspective, and look at whether the trades of
institutional investors are correlated, or alternatively, whether institutions “herd.” By herding
we mean situations where the decisions of individuals depend on observing the actions of others.
Note that this deﬁnition rules out what Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) call “spurious herding,”
that individuals move together because they observe correlated signals about fundamentals. This
is of course the implication of any model of informed trading, that prices move in the direction
of informed trades. If we observe the trades of a group of informed investors we will observe
that prices move together with trading.
Herding behaviour concerns cases where information about other market participant’s be-
haviour is more important than other information. The words “herding” and “fad” have a ﬂavor
of irrationality, but this does not need to be the case. In fact, most theoretical models of herd-
ing behaviour have rational actors. There are a number of reasons that rational institutional
investors may look more to the behaviour of its fellow institutions in choosing investment portfo-
lios. First, institutional investors may not want to “stand out from the crowd,” they are afraid of
the reputational cost of following a diﬀerent strategy from their fellow managers (Scharfstein and
Stein, 1990). Second, institutional traders may make inferences from the trades of their fellow
managers, believing they are better informed, and follow their trading patterns (Bikchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992). Finally, institutional investors may share preferences for stocks of
certain characteristics, such as highly liquid stocks (Falkenstein, 1996). However, herding and
fads may also be a result of irrational behaviour, see the surveys of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch (1998) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003).
While the theoretical literature on herding and related issues is large, with many diﬀerent
models, empirically diﬀerentiating the various models is diﬃcult. The models tend to have
similar empirical implications, that stock prices follow the trades of the group in question.
In our work we will focus on one critical diﬀerence in time series behaviour. If trading by one
investor group, such as institutions, tend to destabilize prices, we would expect to see temporary
movements away from the equilibrium price, ie. we should observe stock increases followed by
3decreases, and vice versa (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). On the other hand, if institutional
trading act to stabilize prices, we should not see any reversals of price movements following fund
trading (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman, 1994).
The empirical literature on herding and mutual fund trading is voluminous. Lakonishok et al.
(1992) is one of the ﬁrst empirical studies using data on mutual fund portfolio compositions.
They ﬁnd some evidence of contemporaneous covariability of mutual fund trading and returns,
concentrated in small stocks. Warther (1995) argues that it is the unexpected cash ﬂow in
and out of mutual funds which is important. Using larger samples of institutional holdings,
Wermers (1999) using quarterly data, and Nofsinger and Sias (1999) using annual data, both ﬁnd
strong evidence of a contemporaneous covariability between changes in mutual fund holdings and
equity returns. Sias et al. (2006) ﬁnd that quarterly returns covary with changes in institutional
ownership. By decomposing quarterly returns they argue that the most likely cause of the
covariability is institutional trading moving prices. Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002)
uses institutional trading following cash ﬂow news to argue that institutions tend to move stocks
in the “right” direction (toward fundamentals). Edelen and Warner (2001), using daily data on
aggregate ﬂows into US equity funds, ﬁnd a strong concurrent relation between ﬂows and returns.
They conclude that this relation is due to ﬂows aﬀecting returns, and that the magnitude of the
relation corresponds to estimates of price impact of institutional trading. Similar conclusions
are reached by Griﬃn, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) using high frequency data. Sias (2004)
argues that institutions tend to herd because they infer information from each other. There
is also a recent literature which intersect institutional trading with market microstructure, by
utilizing high frequency data, see Cambell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009) for a summary of
this literature.
Most of the evidence on mutual fund trading looks at US data. There are some exceptions.
Walter and Weber (2006) uses a sample of German funds. Chen and Hong (2006) uses daily data
on mutual fund holdings in Taiwan. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) uses data from Finland
which is similar to our dataset, and actually contains data of higher frequency, although only 3
years of data. Their focus is more on momentum strategies and similar feedback strategies based
on actual holding periods of investors. There is also a number of investigations using data from
Sweden at the level of individual households, see for example Calvent, Campbell, and Sodini
(2007, 2008), but this has a diﬀerent focus from the present paper.
As mentioned in the introduction, we also intersect with questions where the distinction
between foreign and domestic investors is important, such as international asset pricing and the
question of home bias (Lewis, 1995, 1999). Much of this literature is concerned with the level
of foreign investment. In our work we are however more interested in crossectional diﬀerences
across stocks in foreign investment. This question is much less studied, to some degree due to
lack of data. Notable exceptions include Kang and Stulz (1997), Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999),
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001, 2004) and Covrig et al. (2006). These studies show that foreign
investors in a stock market are predominantly ﬁnancial investors, such as mutual funds. Their
crossectional choices seem to be motivated by liquidity, foreign investors tend to concentrate in
4stock of large ﬁrms with liquid stock.
Finally, the third literature we intersect with is the empirical literature on trading behaviour
of individual investors, which is more recent, and much of it is behaviorally based.1 A well
known starting point for this literature is the documentation that individual owners tend to
trade too often (Barber and Odean, 2000). Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2005) show that at
high frequency individual traders tend to be contrarians. Similar ﬁndings is shown by Jackson
(2003) using Australian data. Using data from Germany, Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller
(2004) show evidence of of herding by individual investors. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)
show that individuals are inﬂuenced by tax concerns. A number of recent papers considers both
institutional traders and individual traders, asking who is most inﬂuential in moving prices,
and who gains. Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2005a) uses data from Taiwan to argue that
individual traders lose to institutional traders. Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2005b) and Hvidkjaer
(2006) uses US microstructure data to ask this question, but they are forced to use order size
to classify trader type. Using holdings data for the US, San (2005) compares the gains from
trading for individual and institutional trading and ﬁnds much less evidence that individual
traders are on the losing side. Boyer and Zheng (2009) also looks at the interaction between
investor groups, but they actually have access to data for all investors in the market, albeit at
a quarterly frequency.
The issues we can consider in the present paper are driven by our available data, namely
monthly observations of the complete holdings of all stock market participants on the Oslo
Stock Exchange. With this data we observe changes from one month to the next, allowing us to
construct various measures of movements between investor groups. The monthly frequency, and
our access to data on all investors, not just mutual funds, is a signiﬁcant improvement on the
quarterly data on institutional holdings used in many of the empirical studies of US data. In our
work we relate monthly changes in portfolio compositions to stock returns, and ask questions
relevant at the monthly frequency. In particular, we will ask whether the quarterly comovement
observed in other studies is a simultaneous movement within a month, or whether it is feedback
eﬀects of more than one month’s duration. An important feature of our data is that we observe
the holdings of all owners, not just the institutional owners. This mean we can look at the overall
eﬀects when one group of owners is increasing or decreasing its stake in a stock. Who takes the
“slack”? While we can make some observations here, the monthly frequency of the holdings data
does limit our ability to consider intra-month eﬀects, in particular testing for causality between
owner types at high frequencies, but our data is still a signiﬁcant improvement on most existing
data sets.2
1This literature intersects with the literature on household ﬁnance as recently surveyed by Campbell (2006).
2The only countries with data similar to ours are Sweden and Finland. Our Norwegian data covers a longer
time period than what has been used so far for these countries.
52 Data
This paper uses data from the Norwegian equity market for the period 1989 to 2007. We use
two types of data. One is data on corporate ownership from the Norwegian Securities Registry
(VPS). This registry was created by law, imposing that all trades in listed shares have to be
electronically registered here. The only exception is that foreign investors are allowed to use
a nominee account with an international securities ﬁrm, where only the aggregate holdings
with the nominee are registered with the Norwegian Securities Registry. From the Securities
Registry we have access to annual (1989-1992) and monthly (1993-2007) data. At each date we
observe the number of stocks owned by every owner. While the data is anonymized, each owner
has a unique identiﬁer which allows us to follow the owners’ holdings over time, and a sector
code that allows us to distinguish between such types as mutual fund owners, ﬁnancial owners
(which include mutual funds), industrial (nonﬁnancial corporate) owners, private (individual)
owners, state owners and foreign owners. It is worth emphasizing that this information is never
completely revealed to the market in general. Only other owners of the same stock may (for a
fee) get the owner list for that stock. Breakdowns of the fraction owned by the owner types we
analyze are published on a monthly basis, but not for individual stocks, only for the aggregate
market.
In addition to the data on equity ownership we use market data from the Oslo Stock Exchange
Data Service (OBI). This source provides stock prices and accounting data, allowing us to
construct return series and calculate accounting based ﬁrm characteristics. The number of
companies on the exchange has increased from 141 in 1989 to 241 in 2007. To avoid problems
due to bid ask bounce and stale observations we require the stocks used in the analysis to have
a price above NOK 10 (About USD 1.50) and have actual trades a minimum of 20 days during
a year. This ﬁlter removes an average of 32 stocks per year.3
3 Crossectional determinants of investment behaviour by diﬀer-
ent owner types
Our data from the securities registry allow us to split equity owners into ﬁve mutually exclusive
groups: ﬁnancial, individual, foreign, nonﬁnancial and state owners. We are also able to identify
which of the ﬁnancial owners are mutual funds. Given the focus on mutual funds in the literature,
we include these as a separate group. Our data on foreign ownership does not distinguish between
types of foreign investors. We can therefore not distinguish between foreign ﬁnancial owners and
other foreign owners. However, from other sources we do know that much of the international
ownership is by ﬁnancial (institutional) owners.4
Let us ﬁrst look at the ownership fractions of the various owner groups used in this study. In
ﬁgure 1 we show time series plots of the average fraction of each company held by the diﬀerent
owner types. While there is some time series variation, the fractions have remained remarkably
3Ødegaard (2007b) provides details about asset pricing data at the Oslo Stock Exchange.
4We refer to Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) for more details about the ownership structure of the OSE.
6stable in the period. Financials have held an average of 17% over the period. The fraction of
this which is mutual funds has increased from about 2% at the beginning of the period to close
to 8% at the end. Foreign ownership has varied between a fourth and a third, with a marked
increase in most recent years. This increase in foreign ownership in the last few years seem to
have been at the expense of individual owners, which have seen a matching decrease in the last
few years, from 25% to 15%. The fraction held by nonﬁnancials has been stable throughout the
period.
Let us discuss public (state) ownership of Norwegian companies in some more detail. As
shown in the graph in the lower left of ﬁgure 1, the average public ownership is low, about 5%
of the average ﬁrm is held by state owners. However, this number hides some diversity. Public
ownership is of two types: One is ownership by public pension funds. Such funds behave like
the typical institutional investor, focusing on returns. However, there is a second type of state
ownership, where the state keeps a direct stake in a few companies viewed as important for the
Norwegian economy. Essentially, this concerns four companies. Throughout the analysis period,
the state held a 49% stake in Norsk Hydro, a metals and oil company. In 1993 the state took
ownership of DnBNOR, the largest Norwegian bank, in the aftermath of a banking crisis. This
stake has since been gradually reduced. In 2001 two very large companies were privatized and
introduced on the OSE. These were Telenor, the state telecom, and Statoil, the state oil company.
The eﬀects of these privatizations are illustrated in ﬁgure 2, which shows what fraction of the
value of the exchange is held by diﬀerent owner types. In terms of value, the public ownership
jumped from 15% to 35% in 2001, a jump purely due to these two privatizations. While the state
has a large stake in the exchange, for the purposes of the present paper we will ignore it. We are
concerned with the dynamics of changes in ownership. For the four large companies where the
stake holds a strategic stake, this stake changes very seldom. For the other companies, where
the stake is due to public pension funds, there is also little dynamics in the state ownership. In
this paper we will therefore concentrate on the other owner types.
In addition to simply looking at the levels of fraction owned by the various types, we char-
acterize further the investment behaviour of the various owner types. Doing so will give some
perspectives on the results linking returns and ownership composition movements, in particular
it will show the need for adjusting any returns for ﬁrm characteristics related to risk, since the
riskiness of portfolios may vary across owner types if the portfolio composition is diﬀerent. Our
evidence on the behaviour of diﬀerent investor types is however of interest in itself, since it is
data which are unavailable in most stock markets.
We ﬁrst, in table 1, split the stocks on the exchange into quartiles by a large number of
stock and company characteristics, and show the average ownership fractions for the quartiles.5
In panel A we split the stocks on the exchange in four groups based on ﬁrm size. We see that
ﬁnancial owners (including mutual funds) and foreigners tend to concentrate their holdings in
larger ﬁrms. This conﬁrms evidence in e.g. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) on the investment
5A number of companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange has dual-class equity, both voting and nonvoting equity.
For these companies we aggregate the characteristics to the company level. See Ødegaard (2007a) for further
details about dual-class equity.
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The ﬁgures shows percentage fractions of the outstanding equity at the stock exchange owned by the six diﬀerent owner
types. For each owner type we calculate what percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity is owned by the given type. We then aggregate
across stocks by calculating equally weighted averages. The owner types are: Mutual Funds: Financial owners which are
mutual funds, a subset of the group of all ﬁnancial owners, Financial owners: Banks, insurance companies and other
ﬁnancial owners, including mutual funds, Individual owners: Private, individual owners, Nonﬁnancial owners: Corporate
(industrial) owners, Foreign owners: International owners, State owners: State, local government and governmental pension
funds.
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The ﬁgures shows percentage fractions of the outstanding equity at the stock exchange owned by the six diﬀerent owner
types. For each owner type we calculate what percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity is owned by the given type. We then
aggregate across stocks by calculating value weighted averages, where the ﬁrm market value is used for value weighting.
The owner types are: Mutual Funds: Financial owners which are mutual funds, a subset of the group of all ﬁnancial
owners, Financial owners: Banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial owners, including mutual funds, Individual
owners: Private, individual owners, Nonﬁnancial owners: Corporate (industrial) owners, Foreign owners: International
owners, State owners: State, local government and governmental pension funds.
9behaviour of foreign owners and Gompers and Metrick (2001) on the composition of the portfolios
of ﬁnancial owners. The state also tends to invest most in the largest ﬁrms, a result which is
driven by the state’s large stake in some of the largest companies on the exchange.
In Panel B of table 1 we have grouped ﬁrms by listing age, time listed on the exchange.
There is no clear pattern here, except a slight over-weighting by ﬁnancials in older ﬁrms.
The corporate governance characteristics of the ﬁrms on the OSE are proxied by a measure
of ownership concentration. We use a Herﬁndahl index to measure ownership concentration.6
In panel C of table 1 we have grouped ﬁrms into four groups sorted by the concentration of
the ﬁrm’s ownership. Here the same pattern is evident as was seen for ﬁrm size. Financial and
foreign owners tend to invest more in ﬁrms with less concentrated ownership. This is oﬀset by
the over-weighting of nonﬁnancials and individual owners in more concentrated ﬁrms.
Another important characteristic relevant for stock investment is the stock’s liquidity. In
panel D of table 1 we use stock turnover as a liquidity measure and group the stocks according
to monthly turnover. We see that ﬁnancial and foreign owners tend to focus on the more liquid
stocks.
We also consider a number of characteristics relevant for stock risk. Panel E of table 1 groups
ﬁrms by the volatility of the ﬁrm’s stock. The clearest patterns are that ﬁnancial owners as a
group tend to prefer the least volatile stocks, while nonﬁnancial owners are more into volatility,
with an overweight of volatile stocks. Panel F of table 1 groups ﬁrms by an estimate of the
systematic risk of the ﬁrm’s equity, measured by stock beta. The clearest pattern in this table
is that individual and nonﬁnancial owners concentrate in the group of lowest beta stocks, while
foreign owners do not seem to mind beta risk, as they are concentrated in equities with high
beta. Finally, in panel G of table 1 we group ﬁrms by book/market ratio. While there are some
diﬀerences across owner types they seem to be nonsystematic.
The picture that appears from this table is that ﬁnancial and foreign investors tend to invest
more in larger ﬁrms with less ownership concentration, lower volatility, and higher stock liquidity.
These characteristics are of course correlated. Larger ﬁrms tend to have more liquid stocks and
less concentrated ownership.
To summarize and formalize the impressions in table 1 we perform a series of regressions
with the ownership fraction by the various owner types as dependent variables and the various
characteristics shown in table 1 as explanatory variables. The results are shown in table 2 and
conﬁrms the results in table 1. For example, mutual funds tend to invest in larger ﬁrms with
lower B/M ratios, lower concentration, higher liquidity, lower stock volatility and higher beta.
Most of these results are in line with ﬁndings from other markets, such as Gompers and Metrick
(2001) on mutual funds and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) on foreign ownership.
6The Herﬁndahl index is the sum of the squared ownership fractions of the ﬁrm’s owners. It has a maximum
of 1 when one owner owns the whole ﬁrm, and decreases as the ownership becomes more diﬀuse. See Bøhren
and Ødegaard (2000) and Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) for further discussion and a comparison with other
concentration measures at the OSE.
10Table 1 Ownership fractions split by ﬁrm characteristics
Panel A: By Firm Size
All Firm Size Quartile
Owner type ﬁrms 1 (smallest) 2 3 4
Financial 17.2 13.2 16.9 18.9 20.0
Mutual fund 6.4 3.5 6.6 7.7 7.9
Individual 21.5 34.9 24.1 18.3 9.1
Foreign 22.2 11.3 18.5 24.7 33.8
Nonﬁnancial 36.1 39.9 40.7 36.7 27.0
State 4.8 2.0 1.7 3.6 11.9
Panel B: By Firm Age
All Firm Age Quartile
Owner type ﬁrms 1 (youngest) 2 3 4
Financial 17.2 16.9 16.9 17.5 17.7
Mutual fund 6.4 6.1 6.7 6.1 6.7
Individual 21.5 22.9 23.8 22.2 17.0
Foreign 22.2 23.3 22.8 21.4 21.0
Nonﬁnancial 36.1 34.7 34.9 37.0 37.7
State 4.8 3.7 3.3 4.4 8.1
Panel C: By Ownership Concentration
All Ownership Concentration Quartile
Owner type ﬁrms 1 (lowest 2 3 4
concentration)
Financial 17.2 20.5 20.0 14.3 13.8
Mutual fund 6.4 7.0 8.1 5.7 4.7
Individual 21.5 36.3 21.1 16.3 11.2
Foreign 22.2 17.5 24.1 22.8 24.7
Nonﬁnancial 36.1 25.0 33.5 45.3 41.2
State 4.8 2.6 3.2 3.0 11.0
The tables shows average ownership fractions for the six owner types. In each table we group the ﬁrms on the exchange
in quartiles determined by some characteristic. In Panel A we group the ﬁrms in four groups by the outstanding value
of the ﬁrm’s equity. Quartile 1 contains the largest ﬁrms on the exchange, quartile 4 the smallest ﬁrms. In Panel B we
group the ﬁrms in age groups. Firm Age: Time since the company ﬁrst listed on the stock exchange. Quartile 1 contains
the youngest ﬁrms, quartile 4 the oldest ﬁrms. Panel C groups the ﬁrms on the exchange by ownership concentration.
Ownership Concentration: Measured by a Herﬁndahl index of owner fractions, Quartile 1 contains the ﬁrms with the lowest
value of the Herﬁndahl index, which are the ﬁrms with least concentrated ownership. The owner types are: Mutual Funds:
Financial owners which are mutual funds, a subset of the group of all ﬁnancial owners, Financial owners: Banks, insurance
companies and other ﬁnancial owners, including mutual funds, Individual owners: Private, individual owners, Nonﬁnancial
owners: Corporate (industrial) owners, Foreign owners: International owners, State owners: State, local government and
governmental pension funds. Data for the Oslo Stock Exchange 1989:12 to 2007:6.
11Table 1 (continued) Ownership fractions split by ﬁrm characteristics
Panel D: By Stock Turnover
All Liqudity Quartile
Owner type ﬁrms 1 (least 2 3 4
liquid)
Financial 17.2 14.2 17.7 18.9 18.7
Mutual fund 6.4 4.1 6.7 7.5 7.7
Individual 21.5 22.4 22.5 19.6 22.5
Foreign 22.2 14.2 19.5 25.6 29.4
Nonﬁnancial 36.1 46.2 36.6 32.0 27.7
State 4.8 4.5 5.3 5.8 3.8
Panel E: By Stock Volatility
All Volatility Quartile
Owner type ﬁrms 1 (least 2 3 4
volatile)
Financial 17.2 20.8 21.7 19.1 15.5
Mutual fund 6.4 6.0 8.7 7.9 5.7
Individual 21.5 24.5 16.6 18.3 21.8
Foreign 22.2 19.3 23.2 24.4 21.8
Nonﬁnancial 36.1 28.9 32.9 35.6 39.1
State 4.8 8.7 7.9 4.9 3.7
Panel F: By Stock Beta
All Stock Beta Quartile
Owner type ﬁrms 1 (lowest 2 3 4
beta)
Financial 17.2 14.2 16.7 19.7 19.0
Mutual fund 6.4 3.6 5.9 7.8 8.3
Individual 21.5 31.7 19.6 14.9 19.1
Foreign 22.2 8.0 21.4 25.9 28.4
Nonﬁnancial 36.1 42.9 39.0 32.8 31.4
State 4.8 4.6 5.4 8.6 4.0
Panel G: By Book/Market Ratio
All Book/Market Quartile
Owner type ﬁrms 1 (lowest 2 3 4
B/M ratio)
Financial 17.2 18.4 18.7 17.6 14.7
Mutual fund 6.4 7.8 6.9 7.1 4.4
Individual 21.5 23.3 19.3 18.6 27.0
Foreign 22.2 26.9 20.9 19.3 17.7
Nonﬁnancial 36.1 29.2 35.9 41.4 38.2
State 4.8 3.9 6.9 4.8 4.0
The tables shows average ownership fractions for the six owner types. In each table we group the ﬁrms on the exchange in
quartiles determined by some ﬁrm characteristic. Panel D calculates the liquidity of a ﬁrm’s stock proxied by turnover. Stock
Turnover: Monthly Turnover as fraction of stock outstanding. Quartile 1 is the stocks with the lowest turnover, i.e. least
liquid according to this liquidity measure. Stock Volatility: Volatility of daily stock returns, Stock Beta: Historical estimate
of stock beta measured using three years of weekly stock returns and Book/Market Ratio: The latest observed Book/Market
Ratio of the company. The owner types are: Mutual Funds: Financial owners which are mutual funds, a subset of the
group of all ﬁnancial owners, Financial owners: Banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial owners, including mutual
funds, Individual owners: Private, individual owners, Nonﬁnancial owners: Corporate (industrial) owners, Foreign owners:
International owners, State owners: State, local government and governmental pension funds. Data for the Oslo Stock
Exchange 1989:12 to 2007:6.
12Table 2 Determinants of ownership fraction
Mutual Funds Financials Foreign Individuals Nonﬁnancials State
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.034 (0.00) 0.101 (0.00) -1.184 (0.00) 1.310 (0.00) 1.517 (0.00) -0.643 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.002 (0.00) 0.006 (0.00) 0.067 (0.00) -0.048 (0.00) -0.060 (0.00) 0.032 (0.00)
BM Ratio -0.011 (0.00) -0.011 (0.00) 0.003 (0.04) 0.030 (0.00) -0.037 (0.00) 0.012 (0.00)
Herﬁndahl Index -0.104 (0.00) -0.100 (0.00) -0.095 (0.00) -0.312 (0.00) 0.218 (0.00) 0.283 (0.00)
Firm listing age -0.000 (0.03) -0.001 (0.00) -0.007 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) 0.010 (0.00) 0.000 (0.22)
Monthly Turnover -0.016 (0.00) -0.021 (0.01) 0.198 (0.00) -0.008 (0.36) -0.152 (0.00) -0.013 (0.10)
Stock Volatility -0.009 (0.71) -0.359 (0.00) 1.024 (0.00) -1.069 (0.00) 0.087 (0.28) 0.184 (0.00)
Stock Beta 0.028 (0.00) 0.022 (0.00) 0.052 (0.00) -0.047 (0.00) -0.016 (0.00) -0.007 (0.00)
n 12171 12171 12171 12171 12171 12171
R2 0.17 0.06 0.31 0.41 0.20 0.21
The table shows the results for six separate regressions explaining ownership fraction by the various owner types. Each
column holds the results for a separate OLS regression. The dependent variable is the ownership fraction by the owner
type listed at the top of each column. The explanatory variables are listed along the rows. Explanatory variables are
ln(Firm Size): Logarithm of the ﬁrm’s equity market value, Book/Market Ratio: The latest observed Book/Market Ratio
of the company, Ownership Concentration: Measured by a Herﬁndahl index of owner fractions, Firm Age: Time since
the company ﬁrst listed on the stock exchange, Stock Turnover: Monthly Turnover as fraction of stock outstanding, Stock
Volatility: Volatility of daily stock returns and Stock Beta: Historical estimate of stock beta measured using three years
of weekly stock returns. The owner types are: Mutual Funds: Financial owners which are mutual funds, a subset of the
group of all ﬁnancial owners, Financial owners: Banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial owners, including mutual
funds, Individual owners: Private, individual owners, Nonﬁnancial owners: Corporate (industrial) owners, Foreign owners:
International owners, State owners: State, local government and governmental pension funds. Data for the Oslo Stock
Exchange 1989:12 to 2007:6.
4 Relations between changes in ownership and stock returns
In this section we consider the links between asset returns and changes in the aggregate portfolio
composition of the various owner types, ﬁrst looking at contemporaneous links (within the
month) and then the lagged relation (next month).
4.1 The contemporaneous relation between stock returns and change in in-
vestor composition
We want to see whether a measure of movement in and out of a stock by a speciﬁc owner group
is contemporaneously related to stock returns. To this end we construct two measures of change
in ownership composition, where we make make a distinction between number of traders and
ownership fraction. This distinction follows e.g. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) and Sias et al.
(2006). Their argument is that looking at number of owners is more likely to catch information,
completely selling out a stock or buying a new stock is a stronger signal than a slight reduction
or increase in numbers of shares held. Aggregate movements are however also informative. We
therefore consider both these measures.
To calculate our ﬁrst measure we consider individual owners without controlling for the stake
of each owner, by measuring the net number of new owners. We do so by taking all owners of a
given group, such as mutual funds, and ﬁnd those that from one month to the next take a stake
in the ﬁrm without having had a stake at the beginning of the month (new owners). From this
number of fresh owners we subtract those that leave the ﬁrm the same month, i.e. had a stake
at the beginning of the month, but had no stake at the end of the month. For example, if ﬁve
mutual funds during a month buy into a company where they had no stake at the beginning
of the month, and during the same month three mutual funds sell their stake in that company
13completely, we would calculate the Net Number of New Owners in the company for the mutual
fund group to be two.
Our second measure of change in ownership composition is to look at the change in the
fraction of the company owned by a given group during a month. If for example the fraction of
the company owned by mutual funds move from 15% at the beginning of the month to 16% at
the end of the month, we would calculate the Change in Ownership Fraction for mutual funds
to be +1%. We calculate these two measures of change in portfolio composition for each of the
six owner groups. Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics for these two measures.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for measures of changes in portfolio composition
Panel A: Net Number of New Owners
Owner type mean Q1 median Q3
Financial -3.18 -200 0 100
Mutual fund 3.73 -100 0 100
Individual 600.34 -1300 -100 800
Foreign 18.94 -200 0 200
Nonﬁnancial 35.33 -300 0 200
State 3.27 0 0 0
Panel B: Change in Ownership Fraction
Owner type mean Q1 median Q3
Financial -0.03 -0.38 0.00 0.30
Mutual fund 0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.12
Individual -0.10 -0.23 -0.01 0.16
Foreign 0.11 -0.29 0.00 0.33
Nonﬁnancial 0.01 -0.35 0.00 0.33
State -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
For each stock and owner type we calculate the two measures of change in ownership composition, Net Number of New
Owners and Change in Ownership Fraction. The owner types are: Mutual Funds: Financial owners which are mutual
funds, a subset of the group of all ﬁnancial owners, Financial owners: Banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial own-
ers, including mutual funds, Individual owners: Private, individual owners, Nonﬁnancial owners: Corporate (industrial)
owners, Foreign owners: International owners, State owners: State, local government and governmental pension funds.
Data for the Oslo Stock Exchange 1992:12 to 2007:6. We include all stocks at the Oslo Stock Exchange satisfying price
and liquidity bounds.
To investigate diﬀerences in stock returns, for each type of owner we sort the stocks into
eight portfolios using the measure of change in portfolio composition as sorting criterion. We
then calculate the realized returns of these portfolios.7 By sorting into portfolios we focus on
crossectional diﬀerences, each time we compare the changes across all stocks available at the
same time. Using portfolios has the added beneﬁt of controlling for aggregate movements into
or out of the market. For example, if mutual funds as a group increase their total investment in
the OSE by one billion NOK from one month to the next, this should aﬀect all stocks, not the
relative ranking of which stocks are most “popular.” By using the relative ranking we do not
need to adjust for the time series evolution of total investment by each group, which we would
otherwise need to.
7We have done these calculations also grouping the stocks into six or ten portfolios. The same pattern emerges.
14Table 4 summarizes the results. A clear pattern emerges. For both mutual fund owners and
foreign owners, portfolio 8, the portfolio of stocks where these owners increased their holdings
the most, has signiﬁcantly higher returns. If we ﬁrst look at mutual funds, in panel A of the
table, where we look at changes in number of owners, portfolio 8 has a return of 4.04% per
month, 2.98% more than the portfolio with the lowest net increase (highest decrease) in number
of mutual fund owners. In annual terms this is a 36% return diﬀerential.
Turning to foreign owners, the measure using number of owners is problematic for foreigners.
Since much of the foreign ownership is in nominee accounts8 where we only observe the total
for each nominee, not the diﬀerent owners for each nominee, it is diﬃcult to argue that changes
in number of international owners are particularly meaningful. For the case of foreign ﬁrms we
therefore instead focus on changes in ownership fraction. Here we see that the portfolio of stocks
with the highest net inﬂow of international owners (portfolio 8) has a monthly return of 3.69%,
which is 1.79% higher than the return of the portfolio with the lowest inﬂow (largest outﬂow)
of international owners (portfolio 1). Hence, we see that returns covary positively with portfolio
increases by institutional and international owners. Prices increase when these owners increase
their stake. Since most of the trading by foreign investors is by institutional investors, it is not
unnatural that these groups have similar eﬀects.
If we now turn to two other groups, individual and nonﬁnancial owners, we see a pattern
opposite of the results for institutional and foreign owners. It is the portfolio of stocks where
these owners reduce their ownership the most which has the highest return. Given the results for
institutional and international owners, this is in some sense to be expected. If one group decreases
its stake, the “slack” has to be taken up by some other investor group. Here it looks like it is
individual and nonﬁnancial investors which take up the slack. The interesting question is which
group(s) of owners are most important for changing the price. Considering the evidence from
other markets, such as the US evidence, where the trading of institutional investors is argued to
push prices, we hypothesize that our ﬁndings are most consistent with institutional and foreign
investors pushing the price. If we want to argue that the results for individual and nonﬁnancial
investors are caused by the active trading decisions of these owners, we would then look at
explaining that the portfolio where these investors are selling the most is the portfolio with the
highest increase in price, which is certainly hard to reconcile with a story of informed investors
moving prices towards fundamentals, although it may be consistent with a “fad” story where
institutional and foreign investors trade to oﬀset “stupid” trades by individual and nonﬁnancial
investors. However, a more likely story is that the results are driven by the institutional trades,
be they domestic and foreign, and the pattern for individual and nonﬁnancial owners is more
a result of the total supply of stocks being constant. If these owner types are less sensitive
with regard to prices, they will end up with higher ownership fractions in the stocks where
the institutions are “getting out.” Vice versa, when institutions are buying, individuals and
nonﬁnancials end up supplying stocks to the institutions due to their lower price sensitivity.
8In 1997 about half of the foreign ownership was in nominee accounts. See Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000).
15Table 4 Same month returns of portfolios sorted on changes in ownership composition
Panel A: Portfolios sorted by Net Number of New Owners
Mutual Fund Financial Individual Foreign Nonﬁnancial State
1 1.06 2.31 3.64 1.92 4.51 2.15
2 0.96 1.26 2.04 1.64 2.05 1.03
3 1.09 0.94 1.51 1.13 0.96 1.31
4 0.72 1.20 0.89 0.98 0.59 1.20
5 1.07 0.97 0.45 1.34 1.12 1.17
6 1.48 1.64 1.23 1.81 1.20 1.20
7 2.84 2.33 2.12 2.68 2.00 1.22
8 4.04 3.20 1.76 2.32 1.27 1.77
Diﬀerence extreme portfolios -2.98 -0.89 1.88 -0.40 3.24 0.38
(pvalue) [0.00] [0.06] [0.00] [0.39] [0.00] [0.40]
Panel B: Portfolios sorted by Change in Ownership Fraction
Mutual Fund Financial Individual Foreign Nonﬁnancial State
1 3.03 3.29 4.32 1.96 4.09 2.77
2 1.62 1.59 2.56 1.38 2.36 1.72
3 0.79 1.00 1.39 0.96 1.57 1.58
4 1.02 0.38 0.75 0.95 0.60 1.68
5 1.40 0.63 0.45 0.87 0.93 1.54
6 0.79 1.36 0.63 1.27 0.85 1.13
7 1.84 1.91 1.14 2.74 1.04 1.62
8 3.30 3.54 2.46 3.69 2.38 1.78
Diﬀerence extreme portfolios -0.27 -0.25 1.86 -1.74 1.72 0.99
(pvalue) [0.50] [0.48] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
The numbers are percentage monthly returns for eight portfolios. The portfolios are sorted by a characteristic of change
in ownership composition. The row labeled Diﬀerence extreme portfolios is the average of a portfolio constructed as the
diﬀerence of portfolios 1 and 8. The number in square brackets in the next row is the p-value for a test that this portfolio
has return equal to zero. For each stock and owner type we calculate the two measures of change in ownership composition,
Net Number of New Owners and Change in Ownership Fraction. The stocks are then sorted into eight portfolios based
on the measure of change in ownership composition. We calculate the portfolio return for the same month as we measure
change in ownership composition. The owner types are: Mutual Funds: Financial owners which are mutual funds, a subset
of the group of all ﬁnancial owners, Financial owners: Banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial owners, including
mutual funds, Individual owners: Private, individual owners, Nonﬁnancial owners: Corporate (industrial) owners, Foreign
owners: International owners, State owners: State, local government and governmental pension funds. Data for the Oslo
Stock Exchange 1992:12 to 2007:6. We include all stocks at the Oslo Stock Exchange satisfying price and liquidity bounds.
164.2 The lagged relation between change in investor composition and stock
returns
While price pressure from institutions is a likely explanation of the contemporaneous comove-
ment observed in the previous section, we do not know whether the price pressure is due to
correlated trading moving prices away from fundamentals (fads), or informed trading moving
prices towards fundamentals. A simple way to test for this is to look at the next month’s returns.
If the price movements are the results of temporary changes, we would expect a reaction where
prices moved back, i.e. the diﬀerence between extreme portfolios should have an opposite sign
next month.
Alternatively, if prices moved towards fundamentals, we would expect the price change to be
permanent. We therefore, in table 5, show the returns for the next month for the portfolios in
table 4. There is no case of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence with an opposite sign. At least at this monthly
frequency, the price changes seem permanent, a result which is in line with an explanation of
institutional investors moving prices towards fundamentals, i.e. institutional trades contain more
information than the trading of individuals and nonﬁnancials.
17Table 5 Next month returns of portfolios sorted on changes in ownership composition
Panel A: Portfolios sorted by Net Number of New Owners
Mutual Fund Financial Individual Foreign Nonﬁnancial State
1 1.42 1.22 1.50 1.41 0.98 1.22
2 1.35 1.35 1.29 1.43 1.99 1.78
3 1.46 1.42 1.71 1.69 1.60 1.39
4 1.81 1.87 1.64 1.87 1.53 1.10
5 1.30 1.67 2.02 1.80 1.91 1.33
6 1.97 1.73 1.78 1.82 1.95 1.50
7 1.77 2.31 1.75 1.73 1.87 1.58
8 2.28 1.89 1.83 1.70 1.64 1.62
Diﬀerence extreme portfolios -0.86 -0.67 -0.34 -0.29 -0.66 -0.40
(pvalue) [0.03] [0.03] [0.38] [0.50] [0.07] [0.31]
Panel B: Portfolios sorted by Change in ownership fraction
Mutual Fund Financial Individual Foreign Nonﬁnancial State
1 1.61 1.64 2.03 2.11 1.89 1.71
2 1.60 1.53 1.67 1.45 1.52 1.70
3 1.46 2.01 1.35 1.51 1.43 1.76
4 1.41 1.27 1.74 1.37 1.26 1.90
5 1.57 1.37 1.31 1.48 1.38 1.89
6 1.19 1.67 1.23 1.98 2.02 1.54
7 2.31 1.76 1.83 1.69 1.97 1.50
8 2.25 2.10 2.26 1.80 1.90 1.49
Diﬀerence extreme portfolios -0.64 -0.46 -0.23 0.31 -0.01 0.22
(pvalue) [0.10] [0.22] [0.56] [0.40] [0.98] [0.50]
The numbers are percentage monthly returns for eight portfolios. The portfolios are sorted by a characteristic of change
in ownership composition. The row labeled Diﬀerence extreme portfolios is the average of a portfolio constructed as the
diﬀerence of portfolios 1 and 8. The number in square brackets in the next row is the p-value for a test that this portfolio
has return equal to zero. For each stock and owner type we calculate the two measures of change in ownership composition,
Net Number of New Owners and Change in ownership fraction. The stocks are then sorted into eight portfolios based
on the measure of change in ownership composition. We then calculate the portfolio return for the next month. The
owner types are: Mutual Funds: Financial owners which are mutual funds, a subset of the group of all ﬁnancial owners,
Financial owners: Banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial owners, including mutual funds, Individual owners:
Private, individual owners, Nonﬁnancial owners: Corporate (industrial) owners, Foreign owners: International owners,
State owners: State, local government and governmental pension funds. Data for the Oslo Stock Exchange 1992:12 to
2007:6.
185 Can diﬀerences in expected returns explain the results?
A potential alternative explanation of the results showing diﬀerences in return levels in the
previous section is that the return diﬀerences reﬂect diﬀerences in expected returns. This caveat
is due to the observed diﬀerences in portfolio composition of the various owner groups, where we
saw that institutions and foreigners tended to invest more in larger companies, and prefer stocks
with lower volatility, etc. The risk characteristics for the portfolios of the diﬀerent owner types
may diﬀer, and the diﬀerences in portfolio returns may merely reﬂect diﬀerences in risk. It is
hard to believe that risk diﬀerences will explain return diﬀerences of two percentage points per
month, but we need to assess the likelihood that this explanation is the cause of the observed
results.
To this end we do a simple risk adjustment, calculating excess returns by subtracting an
estimate of expected returns from realized returns.
eri;t = ri;t   d E[ri;t]
where eri;t is the excess return for stock i at time t, ri;t the realized return and d E[ri;t] the
estimate of expected return. To make a risk adjustment we need to make stand on a model of
expected returns. We report results using the CAPM as a return model,
d E[ri;t] = rf;t + i;t(rm;t   rf;t)
where rf;t is an estimate of the risk free rate and rm;t is the return on a market portfolio. We
estimate betas from a market model regression on historical data.9 The results are shown in
tables 6 and 7. The results conﬁrm our conclusions using returns. The portfolios where mutual
funds and foreign investors have increased their holdings the most have signiﬁcantly larger
excess returns in the same month. The portfolios where individual and nonﬁnancial owners
have reduced their stake the most have signiﬁcantly higher returns. Again, we see no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the next month excess returns.
Our results are thus robust to risk diﬀerences, at least if the CAPM is a suﬃcient model for
expected stock returns. We justify the use of CAPM by evidence in Næs, Skjeltorp, and Øde-
gaard (2008) that the single market factor is the most important factor for pricing Norwegian
asset returns. However, we have for robustness implemented a number of diﬀerent risk adjust-
ments. We have calculated excess returns using Norwegian versions of the Fama and French
(1995) three factor model and the Carhart (1997) four factor model, both calculating averages
of realized excess returns, and embedding the estimation in a formal Black, Jensen, and Scholes
(1972) framework. We do not report results using these alternative estimations,10 but they do
not change our overall conclusions.
9Betas are re-estimated each period using three years of weekly returns data for estimation. The data series
for risk free rates is one month NIBOR interest rates from Norges Bank. The stock market index is an equally
weighted index described in Ødegaard (2007b).
10The results using alternative methods are available upon request.
19Table 6 Same month returns in excess of the CAPM of portfolios sorted on changes in ownership
composition
Panel A: Portfolios sorted by Net Number of New Owners
Mutual Fund Financial Individual Foreign Nonﬁnancial Nonﬁnancial
1 -0.73 0.51 1.67 0.15 2.45 0.16
2 -0.66 -0.20 0.29 0.23 0.47 -0.65
3 -0.46 -0.19 0.15 -0.12 -0.26 -0.31
4 -0.56 0.21 -0.04 0.07 -0.33 -0.42
5 -0.14 -0.11 -0.28 0.29 0.25 -0.21
6 -0.01 0.46 0.25 0.46 0.07 -0.29
7 0.99 0.81 0.63 0.94 0.46 -0.23
8 2.11 1.27 -0.05 0.54 -0.52 -0.17
Diﬀerence extreme portfolios -2.84 -0.76 1.72 -0.38 2.98 0.32
(pvalue) [0.00] [0.11] [0.00] [0.42] [0.00] [0.47]
Panel B: Portfolios sorted by Change in Ownership Fraction
Mutual Fund Financial Individual Foreign Nonﬁnancial Nonﬁnancial
1 1.42 1.81 2.90 0.35 2.60 0.98
2 0.05 0.09 1.00 -0.11 0.73 0.01
3 -0.18 -0.32 -0.10 -0.21 0.06 0.40
4 0.21 -0.42 -0.57 0.04 -0.69 0.61
5 0.25 -0.41 -0.74 -0.18 -0.07 0.57
6 -0.67 -0.09 -0.77 -0.02 -0.45 0.01
7 0.26 0.27 -0.09 0.92 -0.31 0.03
8 1.55 1.91 1.11 2.05 1.00 0.22
Diﬀerence extreme portfolios -0.14 -0.11 1.78 -1.70 1.60 0.76
(pvalue) [0.72] [0.77] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06]
The numbers are percentage monthly excess returns for eight portfolios. The portfolios are sorted by a characteristic of
change in ownership composition. The row labeled Diﬀerence extreme portfolios is the average of a portfolio constructed as
the diﬀerence of portfolios 1 and 8. The number in square brackets in the next row is the p-value for a test that this portfolio
has return equal to zero. For each stock and owner type we calculate the two measures of change in ownership composition,
Net Number of New Owners and Change in ownership fraction. The stocks are then sorted into eight portfolios based
on the measure of change in ownership composition. We calculate the portfolio excess return for the same month as we
measure change in ownership composition. Excess return for stock i at time t are calculated as rit   d E[rit], where rit is
the realized return and d E[rit] is an estimate of the expected return. We use the CAPM as an estimate of expected return,
d E[rit] = rft + (rmt   rft), where rft is the one month treasury interest rate, and rmt the return on an equally weighted
market index. Betas are re-estimated each month using three years of historical data. The owner types are: Mutual Funds:
Financial owners which are mutual funds, a subset of the group of all ﬁnancial owners, Financial owners: Banks, insurance
companies and other ﬁnancial owners, including mutual funds, Individual owners: Private, individual owners, Nonﬁnancial
owners: Corporate (industrial) owners, Foreign owners: International owners, State owners: State, local government and
governmental pension funds. Data for the Oslo Stock Exchange 1992:12 to 2007:6. We include all stocks at the Oslo Stock
Exchange satisfying price and liquidity bounds.
20Table 7 Next month returns in excess of the CAPM of portfolios sorted on changes in ownership
composition
Panel A: Portfolios sorted by Net Number of New Owners
Mutual Fund Financial Individual Foreign Nonﬁnancial Nonﬁnancial
1 -0.39 -0.55 -0.45 -0.51 -0.98 -0.70
2 -0.26 0.04 -0.38 0.05 0.38 0.18
3 0.18 0.32 0.43 0.33 0.47 -0.20
4 0.57 0.87 0.79 0.81 0.63 -0.50
5 0.08 0.67 1.21 0.86 0.96 0.04
6 0.47 0.63 0.72 0.64 0.94 0.10
7 0.01 0.76 0.42 0.29 0.43 0.16
8 0.29 -0.01 0.14 0.14 -0.10 -0.35
Diﬀerence extreme portfolios -0.68 -0.54 -0.60 -0.65 -0.88 -0.35
(pvalue) [0.12] [0.11] [0.13] [0.15] [0.02] [0.34]
Panel B: Portfolios sorted by Change in Ownership Fraction
Mutual Fund Financial Individual Foreign Nonﬁnancial Nonﬁnancial
1 -0.16 0.15 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.06
2 0.03 0.11 0.32 -0.10 -0.01 0.22
3 0.46 0.77 -0.20 0.25 -0.07 0.59
4 0.81 0.49 0.56 0.46 0.18 0.80
5 0.54 0.52 0.15 0.59 0.30 0.92
6 -0.18 0.16 -0.15 0.80 0.69 0.43
7 0.73 0.12 0.52 0.08 0.54 -0.04
8 0.56 0.37 1.03 0.09 0.56 -0.25
Diﬀerence extreme portfolios -0.72 -0.21 -0.52 0.43 -0.06 0.31
(pvalue) [0.06] [0.58] [0.21] [0.25] [0.87] [0.34]
The numbers are percentage monthly excess returns for eight portfolios. The portfolios are sorted by a characteristic of
change in ownership composition. The row labeled Diﬀerence extreme portfolios is the average of a portfolio constructed as
the diﬀerence of portfolios 1 and 8. The number in square brackets in the next row is the p-value for a test that this portfolio
has return equal to zero. For each stock and owner type we calculate the two measures of change in ownership composition,
Net Number of New Owners and Change in Ownership Fraction. The stocks are then sorted into eight portfolios based on
the measure of change in ownership composition. We then calculate the portfolio excess return for the next month. Excess
return for stock i at time t are calculated as rit   d E[rit], where rit is the realized return and d E[rit] is an estimate of the
expected return. We use the CAPM as an estimate of expected return, d E[rit] = rft + (rmt   rft), where rft is the one
month treasury interest rate, and rmt the return on an equally weighted market index. Betas are re-estimated each month
using three years of historical data. The owner types are: Mutual Funds: Financial owners which are mutual funds, a subset
of the group of all ﬁnancial owners, Financial owners: Banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial owners, including
mutual funds, Individual owners: Private, individual owners, Nonﬁnancial owners: Corporate (industrial) owners, Foreign
owners: International owners, State owners: State, local government and governmental pension funds. Data for the Oslo
Stock Exchange 1992:12 to 2007:6.
216 Conclusion
We have looked at simultaneous changes of ownership composition and stock returns at the Oslo
Stock Exchange, using data on the ownership proportions of mutual funds, ﬁnancial, foreign,
individual, nonﬁnancial and state owners. We ﬁrst described the levels of these various ownership
fractions, showing that the fractions vary systematically with ﬁrm characteristics, for example
conﬁrming results from other countries that ﬁnancials tend to invest in larger ﬁrms with highly
liquid stock, and that foreigners have a similar investment pattern.
The most important contribution of the paper is our investigation of the crossectional changes
in ownership composition, where we change the literature’s view of simultaneous correlations
between quarterly changes in ownership and stock returns to a view of monthly simultaneous
changes in ownership and stock returns. Our ﬁnding of little eﬀects over the next month makes
the literature’s hypothesed lead-lag relations within a quarter less likely, we show that the fre-
quency of interest must be shorter term, of at most a month. Our ﬁndings is a direct conﬁrmation
of the indirect evidence of Sias et al. (2006) which used within-quarter returns to bound the
lead-lag relationships within the quarter, and argue for the eﬀects being simultaneous at higher
frequencies. Our results also conﬁrm more limited evidence using microstructure level data of
price movements caused by institutional trading being almost immediate.
We also showed that foreign investors seem to have similar eﬀects as (domestic) institutional
investors, a result which is very likely due to the fact that most foreign investors are institutional.
Finally, we observe that individual and nonﬁnancial owners as groups are oﬀsetting insti-
tutional and foreign investors. This points to the dangers of analyzing one group in isolation.
What may seem like “stupid” behaviour by e.g. individual investors may just be that this group
has a demand curve that is less sensitive than e.g. the institutional investors, leaving the individ-
uals as the residual investors. However, going into detailed analysis of the interaction between
investor groups would require more detailed data on the timing of trading, and must be left as
an important direction for future research.
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